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ABSTRACT
In spite of the wide adoption of policy-based approaches for
security management, and many existing treatments of pol-
icy verification and analysis, relatively little attention has
been paid to policy refinement : the problem of deriving
lower-level, runnable policies from higher-level policies, pol-
icy goals, and specifications. In this paper we present our
initial ideas on this task, using and adapting concepts from
data integration. We take a view of policies as governing the
performance of an action on a target by a subject, possibly
with certain conditions. Transformation rules are applied to
these components of a policy in a structured way, in order
to translate the policy into more refined terms; the transfor-
mation rules we use are similar to those of ‘global-as-view’
database schema mappings, or to extensions thereof. We
illustrate our ideas with an example.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this position paper we present an approach to the prob-
lem of policy refinement. This is the task of automating, so
far as possible, the derivation of lower-level and eventually
implementable policies from higher-level policies, specifica-
tions, and goals—and doing so in an efficient, sound and
complete way. The need for automating refinement is of
particular interest for the rapid and secure configuration
of devices in military and non-military coalition operations.
We generically speak of high-level goals, requirements and
policies and of implementable configurations but in practice
there are multiple levels of abstraction between the overall
goal of an operation or mission and the concrete security con-
figuration of the devices. There are goals or requirements,
policies and a system on which policies operate, specified
at each level of an abstraction hierarchy. The abstractions
used to describe the desired system behaviour at one level
are usually different from those used at a more concrete level
below. For example, at one level a commander may specify
policies in terms of missions, objectives and capabilities of
units whilst at a more concrete level this would typically
break down into individual tasks with their own objectives
to be undertaken by specific devices or army personnel. Sim-
ilarly, at one level a commander may specify requirements on
the confidentiality and integrity of sensor data, this break-
ing down into individual permissions to access either sensor
data or the sensors themselves.
Our proposal is to apply syntactic and algorithmic ideas
from data integration [6] as a way of formalizing the trans-
formation of the various components of a security policy,
and allowing multiple different configurations of a policy to
flow from a single higher-level specification.
2. BACKGROUND: DATA INTEGRATION
Data integration is the provision of a seamless interface
to a number of heterogenous databases. The databases, as-
sociated for an application or the solution of a knowledge
problem, may have different schemata; these may be differ-
ent from the schema in terms of which queries are posed to
the application. All must be systematically related; data
integration, studied in database theory, examines the sound
and efficient generation, composition, and use of such rela-
tionships. We here describe the basics of several approaches
to data integration, using an example about publishing.
Consider three databases s1, s2 and s3, with the schemata:
s1(BookTitle, ISBN,Publisher)
s2(BookTitle,BookAuthor,Field)
s3(ISBN,Year/Month, IsHardback)
Most of these fields are self-explanatory; Field gives the
Dewey code for subject-matter, and IsHardback is 1 where
the book is hardback, 0 otherwise.
Let us suppose that the relations of interest in the ap-
plication that has access to the databases—known as the
mediated schema—are:
book(ISBN,BookTitle,BookAuthor)
subject(Field,BookTitle,Year/Month)
publisher(ISBN,Publisher, IsHardback)
Queries to access the databases, formed within the applica-
tion, are expressed in terms of the mediated schema. For
example, if one wanted to know the titles and ISBNs of all
hardback books on religions of Indic origin:
q(Ttl, ISBN)←
publisher(ISBN, , 1), subject(294,Ttl, ), book(ISBN,Ttl).
A central task for data integration here is to write rules
that let the query be translated into queries to the com-
ponent databases’ schemata, s1, s2 and s3. The Global as
View or GAV approach allows Horn rules, with relations
of the mediated schema in the head, and a conjunction of
source relations as positive literals in the body. For example:
book(ISBN,BookTitle,BookAuthor)←
s1(BookTitle, ISBN, ), s2(BookTitle,BookAuthor, ).
Query answering, for this type of rule, is a matter of un-
folding the relations in the query. A different approach to
the translation of queries into the terms of the component
databases is to use Local as View or LAV, effectively the
inverse of GAV. Here, relations of the source database are
defined in terms of the mediated schema, for example:
s1(BookTitle, ISBN,Publisher)←
book(ISBN,BookTitle, ), publisher(ISBN,Publisher ).
Again, Horn clauses are used, but in this case query an-
swering is not simply unfolding the relations; there are algo-
rithms [9, 5] to transform, at a preliminary stage, LAV rules
into a form with mediated schema relations in the head and
source relations in the body—only then may unfolding pro-
ceed. Why then use LAV rules in the first place? A promi-
nent advantage is the ease of update when databases are
added to, or removed from, the pool. With GAV rules, the
new source schema may appear in any rule defining a relation
of the mediated schema, where the schemata for all other
source databases may occur: so the relationships between
the new database’s schema and all other schemata must be
systematically understood. In contrast, if LAV rules are
used and a new database is added, the only mappings that
need to be understood are between the new base’s schema
and the mediated schema.
3. POLICY REFINEMENT RULES
We conceive of policies as governing the performance of an
action by a subject on a target under certain conditions. The
conditions may refer to previous system history, policy logic,
and actions. The domains where policies apply are described
using fluents (for changing facts about system state), static
facts (unchanging properties of systems) and events; the
latter are akin to actions, but are not governed by policies.
For example, an authorization policy that
UK signal corps personnel are permitted to view
low-resolution camera data from sensors in quad-
rant four if they have previously registered with
central information services
could be expressed in our policy language as:
permitted(Sub,Tar, camera(L), T )←
holdsAt(personnel(Sub, uk.signals), T ),
object type(Tar, stillCam),
object property(stillCam, resolution, low, L),
do(Sub, centralInformation, register, T ′),
T ′ < T.
The predicate permitted marks a positive authorization pol-
icy (denied would be used for negatives), with four argu-
ments for the subject, target, action, and time at which the
permission is given; this time is typically a variable which
enables the time of the permission to be related by con-
straints to the times at which historical conditions must be
true. In the policy above, it must hold that the subject
of the policy is a member of the UK signal corps at any
time T permission is to be given. At some previous time
T ′ < T , the same subject must have ‘done’ a register action
with centralInformation (this may also have been subject
to a further policy). Only permission for low-quality still
camera data is covered by the policy above; the levels that
count as low are determined by the relevant object property
condition. For full details on the policy language we use,
see [3] or [1]. We stress that although it is necessary to use
a given formalism for representing policies, and describing
the domains in which they operate (for the latter, we use
the Event Calculus [8] or EC), common formalisms and lan-
guages can be translated into our language. In the case of
domain descriptions, state charts and action languages, and
commonly-used ontologies, can be translated into the EC.
We have ourselves formulated translation schemes between
our policy language and Ponder2 [4]; similar schemes can be
framed for XACML2 [10], for instance.
There are several reasons why data integration and its
methods could be used for policy refinement in general, and
specifically for our approach to security policy analysis and
refinement. Part of the process of refinement is to move
from policies expressed in higher-level, abstract vocabular-
ies to lower level vocabularies; the degree of abstraction con-
cerns the detail with which subjects, targets, actions, fluents,
static facts and events are represented. Therefore, we rea-
son that vocabulary mapping rules, for each component of
a policy, will be a key part of a refinement framework. We
believe these mapping rules would contain just the type in-
formation that the GAV or LAV clauses express, and that
aspects of policy refinement that concerns vocabulary refine-
ment is analagous to query reformulation within the context
of data integration. Algorithms and theorems developed for
data integration can be used or extended to apply to policy
refinement. It is not hard to show that query reformulation
using GAV rules is polynomial in the size of the query and
rules. A transformed version of LAV rules and queries can be
constructed using the inverse rules algorithm [9, 5] in time
polynomial in the size of a conjunctive query and set of con-
junctive source descriptions (i.e. LAV rules). The presence
of PTIME complexity theorems in both cases is encouraging
for the feasibility of their use for policy refinement.
We now describe and illustrate by example one category
of these vocabulary mappings, or refinement rules: that
concerning action refinement. We concentrate on an au-
thorization policy, and focus on the policy without giving
many details about the underlying domain. A preliminary
step in policy refinement, before transformation rules can
be applied, may be to formalize a natural language policy in
our logical policy language (may, because policies may also
be automatically derived, for example from security goals).
The highest level of user-entered policy would thus be repre-
sented in a carefully circumscribed slice of natural language;
elementary parsing transforms policies in such structured
natural language into an equivalent form in our formal pol-
icy language (see [2] for first steps towards this). The ex-
ample used is one fragment of a larger scenario we have
developed to develop and test the application of ideas from
data integration to many different aspects of refinement.
Thus, consider the following:
High quality sensor information is reserved for US
personnel only
Initial formalization, breaks this apart into one positive and
one negative authorization policy:
permitted(Sub,Tar, sensor data(high), T )← (1)
holdsAt(personnel(Sub, us), T ),
holdsAt(sensor(Tar), T ).
denied(Sub,Tar, sensor data(high), T )←
holdsAt(personnel(Sub, us), T ),
holdsAt(sensor(Tar), T ).
At the most abstract view of the system, as can be seen,
there is a single action sensor data(+Quality), where Quality
must take one of the ground values {low,medium, high}. The
effects of the performance of such an action, if permitted,
could be to set up a streaming channel or data relay between
the requester and the data source. These effects would be
modelled by the domain description; we omit the details.
Let us suppose that there are three types of sensor:
1. A still camera that can take pictures at three resolu-
tions: 5, 3 and 1 Mega-pixels (Mp).
2. A video camera that can take videos with two resolu-
tions: 2CIF (704×240) and 4CIF (704×480).
3. A global positioning system (GPS) with precisions 1
metre, 10 metres, 100 metres and 1000 metres.
Each of these types of sensor has an action that is the sensor-
specific instance of the sensor data action. Thus, pictures
from the still camera are obtained using
camera(+Resolution)
Streamed videos from the video camera are obtained using
videoCam(+Resolution)
The locations of devices with GPS receivers are acquired
with
gpss(+Device,+Precision)
Each of these actions may only be executed on the type of
device mentioned: a subject may not, for instance, run a
videoCam action on a still camera. This shows what ought
to be intuitively obvious: there is a close logical link between
targets and actions, forced because the nature of the target
on which an action is performed determines the kinds of
action that can be performed on it. The structure of action
refinement rules should reflect this.
We give three examples of action refinement rules that
transform the higher-level action sensor data into device-
specific forms. The first two relate to still cameras:
Tar:sensor data(high)← sensor(Tar). (2)
⇓
Tar:camera(5Mp)← still camera(Tar)
Tar:sensor data(medium)← sensor(Tar). (3)
⇓
Tar:camera(3Mp)← still camera(Tar).
The meaning of the first rule is that a sensor data(high)
action on a sensor can be understood, at a lower level of ab-
straction, as a camera action, with parameter 5Mp, on a still
camera. (It may be easier to put this the other way round:
performing a camera action on a still camera will count as
[7], implement, or be an instance of, the sensor data action
on a sensor.) The second rule refines a sensor data(medium)
action into another camera action, but with a different con-
figuration. Other rules apply to other types of device, for
example:
Tar:sensor data(high)← sensor(Tar). (4)
⇓
Tar:videoCam(4CIF)← video camera(Tar).
Here, the high-level sensor data action, with the high param-
eter, is refined into a different low-level action, on a different
kind of target: a video camera.
In general, the form of an action refinement rule is:
Tar:a(~x)← l1(~x1), . . . , lm(~xm).
⇓
Tar′:a′(~x′)← l′1(~x′1), . . . , l′n(~x′n).
Everything above the vertical arrow is the top; everything
below, the bottom. Tops and bottoms have a clause-like
structure, whose heads contain a target and action, and
whose bodies are conjunctions of fluents or fluents preceded
by negation-as-failure not, or static facts possibly preceded
by not.
Application of the action refinement rules above to the
positive authorization policy (1) is straightforward. The
head of the top of an action refinement rule is matched
against the head of the policy rule: targets to targets, ac-
tions to actions. Clearly the heads of policy (1) and rule (2)
match. Then the bodies are checked: all literals in the body
of the top of (2) must match literals in the body of the policy
(in the case of fluents, after being wrapped in the holdsAt
predicate). In our case, they do. The actions and literals
are then replaced, in the policy, with the bottom of the re-
finement rule, to produce:
permitted(Sub,Tar, camera(5Mp), T )← (5)
holdsAt(personnel(Sub, us), T ),
holdsAt(still camera(Tar), T ).
Rule (3) does not match, in this way, the original policy (1).
But the third action refinement rule (4) does, to produce:
permitted(Sub,Tar, videoCam(4CIF), T )←
holdsAt(personnel(Sub, us), T ),
holdsAt(video camera(Tar), T ).
At the next level of concreteness, permission to view images
produced from by still cameras may be refined into a form
close to SQL queries to access a picture database where such
images are stored. Consider the following rule:
Tar:camera(5Mp)← still camera(Tar).
⇓
picDB:select(res5Mp).
Application of this refinement-rule to the policy (5) gives
the following authorization policy:
permitted(Sub, picDB, select(res5Mp), T )←
holdsAt(personnel(Sub, us), T ),
At this point, the security policy is close to the content of a
SQL query such as
GRANT SELECT ON picDB.res5CIF TO USid@ahost
Subject refinement (which we do not illustrate here) supplies
the remaining phases of refinement, and the policy can then
be straightforwardly translated from our logical language
into SQL. (Of course, we use SQL as an example: refinement
rules and translation schemes could be produced for many
different implementable languages.)
In this way multiple action refinement rules can control
the setting of different configurations for security policies:
the same high-level policy can be refined in different ways,
producing different settings appropriate for each of the de-
vices to which the policy applies, and the policies that re-
sult from refinement can be expressed in different languages.
The action-refinement rules we have shown here do not cor-
respond exactly to the syntax of GAV or LAV rules for data
integration. We have found that in the case of fluent and
static fact refinement, either GAV or LAV rules are suitable,
but that action refinement requires an extension of the syn-
tax, allowing reference to conditions qualifying the target
and action. Such an extension of the syntax does not, we
believe, increase the computational complexity of using the
rules for refinement. Subject refinement, and a more general
form of target refinement than that shown above, involves
different considerations again, and is current work.
4. CONCLUSION
We described the essence of one thread of our approach
to policy refinement: the use of data integration as start-
ing point for refinement specification. We believe that the
existence of algorithms for query reformulation, and their
low computational complexity, is very promising. But data
integration needs to be complemented to cover many other
issues of refinement. For example, a high-level goal may be
achieved by several combinations of concrete actions i.e., the
action decomposition process typically has several solutions.
It is therefore necessary to choose amongst them through
some algorithm that selects between alternative refinement
solutions. Also refinement must be interleaved with analy-
sis. This will ensure that refined policies are implementable
on the target systems and do not violate predefined sys-
tem constraints. Parallel, distributed refinement could lead
to policies which conflict with each other as the refinement
context will not be the same across all entities. We have an
approach for centralized policy analysis [3] that can be used
for policies during, or at the end of, the refinement process;
in a related strand of current work we are generalizing this
to distributed policy analysis.
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